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QUESTION PRESENTED
Should the Court amend its opinion to hold that defendant's appeal from the trial
court's unsigned denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea is not late, but rather,
premature?
RELIEF SOUGHT
The State does not dispute that the Court correctly dismissed defendant's appeal
for lack of jurisdiction-—the State disagrees only with how the Court reached that result.
For reasons set forth below, the Court lacks jurisdiction here, not because defendant
failed to timely file a notice appeal from the date of sentencing, but rather because
defendant prematurely appealed from the trial court's unsigned denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. The Court should therefore dismiss the appeal without
prejudice and allow the trial court to enter a signed, final appealable order.

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS DEFENDANT'S APPEAL AS
PREMATURE BECAUSE THE MINUTE ENTRY DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WAS
UNSIGNED AND CONSEQUENTLY THERE IS NO FINAL
APPEALABLE ORDER
The Court dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that
"[defendant] was required to file the notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of the
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to be timely," and defendant did not do so. State
v. Stringham, 2003 UT App 105 (unpublished) (a copy is attached). However, the
Court's analysis overlooks that a defendant who pleads guilty cannot directly appeal
from a judgment and commitment order. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 13111312 (Utah 1987). As a result of this oversight, the Court mistakenly runs the time for
appeal in this guilty plea case from the order entering judgment rather than from the
denial of the motion to withdraw the plea. Hence, the Court's discussion regarding the
tardiness of the instant appeal is erroneous and should be corrected.
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that direct appeals be
taken from "final orders and judgments." "A judgment is final when it ends the
controversy between the parties litigant." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538,
539 (Utah 1979). In a criminal proceeding, the Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment
Order is usually the final order that disposes of the case and starts running the thirty-day
window to file an appeal from the conviction. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a) ("[T]he notice
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days

2

after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from"). However, post-judgment
motions can also result in final appealable orders. See Cahoon v. Cahoon 641 P.2d 140,
142 (Utah 1982). Moreover, a defendant who challenges his guilty plea on appeal must
first file a motion to withdraw the plea. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311-1312
(remanding to allow defendant to file a motion to withdraw guilty plea in a case where
no motion had previously been filed but where notice of appeal was timely in order to
avoid possibility that defendant could prosecute two appeals in the same case); State v.
Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 3,40 P.3d 630 (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction because
defendant did not timely move to withdraw his guilty plea); Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d
341, 342, 344-345 (Utah App. 1988) ("In Gibbons, the Supreme Court determined that
a defendant could not simply appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea. Id. at 13111312. Rather, defendant must first file a motion to withdraw plea, giving the court
who took the plea the first chance to consider defendant's arguments. If the motion is
denied, defendant could then appeal—not from the conviction per se, but from the
denial of the motion").
He may file this motion until 30 days after sentencing. State v. Ostler, 2001 UT
68, ^ 11-13, 31 P.3d 528 (holding "that the thirty-day limit for filing a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea found in [UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999)], begins to run
at the time the district court entersfinaljudgment"). In this case, it is the trial court's
post-judgment order denying the motion thatfinallydisposes of the case and which is a

3

final appealable order under Utah R. App. P. 3(a). Ibid. Consequently, a notice of appeal
filed within 30 days of this deniaMs timely.
Based on the above, it is of no consequence here that defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea did not toll the time to appeal from the judgment under the preNovember 2002 rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as found by this Court.
See Stringham, 2003 UT App 105 (unpublished). Precisely because defendant pled
guilty to the charges against him, he was precluded from directly appealing the
judgment and commitment order.1 See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311-1312; Reyes, 2002
UT 13, f 3; Summers, 759 P.2d at 342, 344-345. Defendant's appeal is thus from the
post-judgment order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. It follows that
the time for filing an appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea runs

(

from the date of the denial, not from the entry of judgment, as erroneously found by this
Court. See Stringham, 2003 UT App 105 (unpublished).
Indeed, to hold as Stringham does effectively precludes defendants, who, like
Stringham, file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea after the entry of judgment, see
i

Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^ 11-13, but who do not obtain a ruling thereon within thirty-days
after the entry of judgment.2 Under the current decision, because the trial court did not
—

i
1

While defendant would not be precluded from directly appealing a sentence
entered pursuant to a guilty plea, see State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278-79 (Utah
1989), defendant raises no issues regarding his sentence here.
i
2

Notably, there is no pre-November 2002 rule or statute requiring trial courts to act
on post-judgment motions to withdraw a guilty plea within the thirty-days following
4

deny defendant's timely post-judgment motion to withdraw until the fifty-fourth day after
sentencing, defendant lost his right to challenge that denial. See Stringham, 2003 UT
App 105 (unpublished). In extending the time to appeal the denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea from thirty-days after entry of the plea to thirty-days after
sentencing, the supreme court in Ostler surely contemplated that defendants so doing
would thereafter be able to appeal within thirty days of any subsequent denial of the
motion, regardless of whether the denial occurs on the twenty-ninth, thirty-first, or, as
here, the fifty-fourth day following sentencing. Id. at ff 11-13. Nothing in Ostler
suggests that the supreme court meant to alter the traditional rule that an appeal from the
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be filed within thirty-days of the denial.
See, e,g, Utah R. App. P. 4(a) ("the notice of appeal... shall be filed with the clerk of the
trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from").
As to the effect of the 2002 amendment to rule 4(a), noted in Stringham, 2003 UT
App 105, n.2, the 2002 amendment was clearly adopted in response to Ostler's extension
of the time to withdraw a guilty plea. See Ostler, 2001 UT 68,fflf11-13. In extending the
time to appeal the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea from thirty days after entry
of the plea to thirty days after sentencing, Ostler virtually insured that motions to
withdraw guilty pleas would not be decided prior to sentencing and thereby significantly

imposition of sentence or entry of judgment. However, section 77-13-6(2)(b) was
recently amended to provide that a motion to withdraw must be filed before
announcement of sentence and that the sentence "may not be announced unless the
motion [to withdraw] is denied." See H.B. 238, Gen. Sess. (Ut. 2003).
5

increased the possibility that criminal defendants would file two separate appeals in the
same case. For example, a defendant who timely moved to withdraw his guilty plea
within 30 days after sentencing, likely would not receive a ruling on that motion until
after the time for appealing his sentence had run. Thus, if the defendant is dissatisfied
with his sentence, he must file a notice of appeal before the trial court rules on his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. If the trial court then denies his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, the defendant must file a second notice of appeal from the denial, thereby creating
two appeals in the same case, although he could later move the appellate court to
consolidate the two appeals. Under the 2002 amendment to rule 4(a), filing a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea tolls the time for filing the notice of appeal until the "entry of the
order . . . denying the motion to withdraw the plea," and thereby precludes the above
scenario of two appeals in the same case. Thus, the amendment is not reasonably read to
suggest that a notice of appeal from the denial of a post-judgment motion to withdraw
filed on the thirty-first, or even the fifty-fourth day after sentencing is late, regardless of
whether the motion has been acted upon in that timeframe.
Rather, for the reasons originally set out in the State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal
for Lack of Jurisdiction, defendant's notice of appeal, filed outside the thirty-days
following sentencing, but prior to the entry of a final order, was premature, not late.
Specifically, the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea in an
unsigned minute entry (R78-79), which is not a final appealable order for purposes of
appeal. See State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264, 264 (Utah 1997). And, absent an entry of a
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final order, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal. Id. Therefore, because
defendant's notice of appeal from the unsigned order was premature rather than late, this
case should be dismissed without prejudice to allow the trial court to enter a signed, final
appealable order. State v. Gardner, 2001 UT 41, \ 10, P.3d 1043 (recognizing that
defendant had not lost his right to appeal "[i]nsomuch as no order has yet been prepared,"
and directing that defendant "may file a new appeal after the trial court signs and enters
the formal order").
CONCLUSION
The Court mistakenly ran the time for appeal in this guilty plea case from the
judgment and commitment order and on that erroneous ground determined the notice was
late. The State therefore asks the Court to amend its opinion to reflect that defendant's
appeal from the unsigned denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty is premature, not
late, and to dismiss the appeal without prejudice to allow the trial court to enter a signed
and final appealable order.
The State certifies that this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 9A April 2003.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—'•—00O00—:—

State of Utah,
Pla.intiff and Appellee,
v.
Kyle Kent Stringham,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20020591-CA

F I L E D
(April 10, 2003)
|2003 UT App 105[

Eighth District, Duchesne Department
The Honorable A. Lynn Payne
Attorneys: Julie George, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Bench.
PER CURIAM:
This case is before the court on Appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction because of an untimely notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P.
10(a). The Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in this case was entered on
May 22, 2002. A motion to withdraw the guilty plea was filed on June 6,
2002, and an unsigned minute entry denying that motion was entered July
15, 2002. (1) A notice of appeal was filed on July 16, 2002.
Appellee contends that the notice of appeal was premature because
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Appellant appeals from an unsigned minute entry denying his motion to
withdraw his plea. However, the notice of appeal was not premature; it was
filed late. Appellant may not appeal a plea of guilty unless he moves to
withdraw the plea in the trial court. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,510,- '•
40 P.3d 630. However, the rule in effect at all times relevant to this
appeal did not include a motion to withdraw a plea among those post-trial
motions that toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. :; See Utah R.
App P. 4(b) (enumerating those post-trial motions that toll the time for
filing of the notice of appeal). For this reason, Appellant was required
to file the notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of the Judgement,
Sentence, and Commitment, to be timely. He did not do so.
Because the notice of appeal was untimely, we lack jurisdiction over the
appeal. See Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamareaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) ("When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains
only the authority to dismiss the action.").
We dismiss the appeal as untimely.

Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge
•

•

•

'

<

Judith M. B i l l i n g s ,
\ s s o c i a t e Presiding Judge
<

Russell W. Bench, Judge
.. The trial court minute entry erroneously characterizes the motion as
m e for a new trial, but no motion for a new trial was filed. Clearly,
:his was a clerical error and the docket should show Appellant's motion as
i motion to withdraw his plea.
!. Utah R. App. P. 4(b) was amended in November of 2002 to include a
lotion to withdraw a plea among those post-trial motions that toll the
:ime for filing the notice of appeal. However, our analysis is based upon
:he rule in effect at-the time of this case.
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